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INTRODUCTION
Though I never knew Professor Brainerd Currie-he died when I
was just a lad-I did know and admire his son, Professor David
Currie, who passed away in 2007. I was especially impressed by the
younger Currie's sustained interest in congressional
constitutionalism'-that is, in various constitutional issues that have
arisen in Congress and that have often involved special rules and
procedures of Congress itself. In the tradition of the younger
Professor Currie, I propose to use this hour, as the 2013 Currie
Lecturer, to address one of the most important contemporary issues
of congressional constitutionalism: the Senate filibuster.
In this hour I shall argue that, contrary to what many senators
say and what some of them might even believe, the Senate may
eliminate current filibuster practice on any day it chooses, and may do
so by a simple majority vote. My main argument today reprises
material from my recent book, America's Unwritten Constitution: The
Precedents and Principles We Live By, and I am particularly grateful
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t Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. This essay derives,
virtually verbatim, from the Currie Lecture, delivered at Duke University School of Law on
February 21, 2013. Special thanks to the editors of the Duke Law Journal for their kind
willingness to accommodate my crazy schedule. Readers of this Lecture may be interested to
learn that, exactly nine months after I delivered these remarks at Duke-on Thursday,
November 21, 2013-the U.S. Senate chose to embrace the constitutional theory of filibuster
reform presented in this Lecture. For a brief analysis of the Senate's actions on November 21,
2013 and of their dramatic implications, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Nuclear-Option Genie is
Out of the Bottle, SLATE (Nov. 21, 2013, 5:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/11/
21/senate-goes-fornuclearoption.and.nothing-will-ever be thesame.html.
1. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD 1789-1801 (1997).
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that the Duke Law School has kindly arranged for copies of this book
to be given to the students in attendance today. In a brief Coda to my
main argument, I shall offer additional elaboration, placing my views
in the context of recent events on Capitol Hill and explaining how my
proposed approach intersects with longstanding arguments about
whether the U.S. Senate is or is not a "continuing body."
I.
Multimember institutions, such as the House, the Senate, and the
Court, can do nothing-nothing at all!-unless certain basic social-
choice rules are in place within these institutions. Crucially, there
must exist master rules that determine how many votes within each
institution will suffice to achieve certain results. Yet the written
Constitution does not textually specify the master voting rule that
operates inside these three chambers. Happily, two centuries of actual
practice make clear that the bedrock constitutional principle within
each is simple majority rule.
Some senators today, however, think otherwise. They think that
the Senate's current filibuster system cannot be abolished by a simple
majority vote. They should think again, for they have misread
America's Constitution, written and unwritten. To see why, let's first
canvas the internal voting rules and deliberation protocols that apply
within the Supreme Court and the House of Representative and then
use the evidence and insights generated by this canvas to analyze the
modern Senate filibuster.
The Constitution explicitly provides for a Chief Justice, but does
not specify his role, except as the official who chairs presidential
impeachment trials. Perhaps the Chief's most important Court role,
established by Court tradition, involves his power to assign opinions.
Whenever he finds himself in the initial majority after oral argument,
he decides which Justice shall take the lead in trying to compose an
opinion on behalf of the Court. Of course, he may opt to assign the
opinion-writing power/duty to himself, as John Marshall did in most
important cases of his day, and as Earl Warren did in landmark cases
such as Brown v. Board of Education and Reynolds v. Sims.
Thanks to the necessary-and-proper clause, Congress has also
vested the Chief Justice with sundry administrative and supervisory
responsibilities for the federal judiciary as a whole, but none of these
congressional statutes has done much to clarify the Chief's authority
within the Supreme Court itself. And while Congress has defined the
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jurisdiction of the Court and has enacted various rules of evidence
and procedure for litigants who come before the Justices, federal
lawmakers have opted to leave a great deal of the internal protocol
among the Justices to be worked out by the Justices themselves.
But by what voting rule? While the written Constitution left the
matter unspecified, four interrelated factors pointed to simple
majority rule as the master norm among the Justices, at least in the
absence of some contrary protocol prescribed by Congress.
First, majority rule has unique mathematical properties that
make it the obvious answer. When an uneven number of Justices are
deciding between two simple alternatives, such as whether to affirm
or reverse a lower-court decision or whether to rule for the plaintiff
or the defendant in a trial situation, there is always an alternative that
commands the support of a majority, but there might be no
alternative that enjoys more than majority support.
Second, anyone who had studied Locke's canonical Second
Treatise of Government-as had most of the leading American
revolutionaries-had learned that majority rule was the natural
default principle of all assemblies. In Locke's words: "[I]n assemblies
impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that
positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for
the act of the whole and, of course, determines, as having by the law
of nature and reason the power of the whole."3
Other Founding-era authorities said the same thing. Building on
this broad tradition, Thomas Jefferson's mid-1780s booklet, Notes on
the State of Virginia, declared that "Lex majoris partis [is] founded in
common law as well as common right. It is the natural law of every
assembly of men, whose numbers are not fixed by any other law."4 In
written remarks read aloud to the Philadelphia Convention,
Benjamin Franklin described majority rule as "the Common Practice
2. For general discussion of the various powers of the Chief Justice, see Judith Resnik &
Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief
Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575 (2006).
3. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 96 (Thomas P. Peardon, ed,
1952) (1689). See generally WILLMOORE KENDALL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE DOCTRINE OF
MAJORITY-RULE (1959); Bernard Wishy, John Locke and the Spirit of '76, 73 POL. SCI. Q. 413
(1958).
4. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (Frank Shuffelton ed.,
Penguin Books 1999) (1795) (footnotes omitted) (citing Brooke, Hakewell, and Puffendorf).
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of Assemblies in all Countries and Ages." None of his fellow
delegates said otherwise.
Third, the Constitution's text evidently incorporated this
majoritarian premise, albeit by implication. Whenever a federal
institution was authorized by the Constitution to make a certain
decision using some principle other than simple majority rule, the
exception to the (implicit) rule was specified in the document itself.
For example, the text made clear that a two-thirds vote was necessary
for the Senate to convict an impeachment defendant or approve a
proposed treaty, or for either house to expel a member, approve a
constitutional amendment, or override a presidential veto. For other
actions, majority rule simply went without saying.
Several of the Constitution's provisions prescribing
supermajorities make the most sense only if we assume that majority
rule was the self-evident background principle that applied in the
absence of a specific clause to the contrary. Thus, Article I
presupposed that each house would "pass" legislative bills by
majority vote-except when trying to override presidential vetoes,
which would require a special supermajority. The supermajorities for
constitutional amendments likewise were designed to be more
demanding than the simple majorities for ordinary statutes; and the
Senate supermajority for treaty ratification was meant to erect a
higher bar than for ordinary Senate agreement to ordinary
legislation-a higher bar meant to offset the absence of the House in
the formal treaty making process. Similarly, the provisions
empowering each house to exclude improperly elected or
constitutionally ineligible candidates were meant to operate by simple
majority rule-as distinct from the exceptional supermajority rule that
applied when a house sought to expel duly elected and fully eligible
members.
5. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 198 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
6. On the enactment of ordinary laws by simple majority, see generally THE FEDERALIST
No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton); id. NO. 58 (James Madison); id. No. 62 (James Madison); Jed
Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73 (1996). On the basic
difference between statutes and constitutional amendments, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3-33 (1991). On the way in which treaty supermajority rules help offset
the absence of the House, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
190 (2005). On the key differences between house exclusion by majority vote and house
expulsion by supermajority, see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 496, 506-12 (1969).
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But if majority rule truly went without saying, then why did the
Framers feel the need to specify in Article I, Section 5 that a majority
of each house would constitute a quorum? The obvious answer is that
state constitutions and British practice had varied widely on the
quorum question, and thus on this special issue there did not exist an
obvious default rule from universal usage or mathematical logic. For
example, Pennsylvania set the quorum bar at two-thirds, whereas the
English rule since the 1640s had provided that any 40 members could
constitute a quorum of the House of Commons. But neither
Parliament nor any state circa 1787 generally required more than
simple house majority votes for the passage of bills or the adoption of
internal house procedures, even though in many of these states no
explicit clause explicitly specified this voting rule. In America circa
1787, majority rule in these contexts thus truly did go without saying.
We should also note that the Constitution's electoral-college
clauses explicitly speak of the need for a majority vote. In this
context, involving candidate elections, majority rule did not go
without saying as the obvious and only default rule. Plurality rule
furnished a salient alternative (and indeed the rule that even today
remains the dominant one for candidate contests in America). But
this point about candidate elections, which might involve voting on
three or more persons simultaneously, did not apply to the enactment
of house rules or the exclusion of members under Article I, Section 5
or the enactment of laws under Article I, Section 7-all of which
involved binary decisions against the status quo. (As noted, majority
rule has unique mathematical advantages in situations of binary
choice.)
Fourth, and as I explain in considerable detail in my book,
America's Unwritten Constitution, majority rule was not only implicit
in the Constitution's text, but also visible in its very enactment.
Nothing in Article VII explicitly said that the thirteen state
ratification conventions should act by simple majority rule, but this is
what every convention did, and in a manner that suggested that the
issue was self-evident.
Thus, in a wide range of constitutional contexts, majority rule
went without saying. For the same reason this background rule
applied to ratifying conventions, and to each house of Congress, it
applied to the Court as well.
7. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 56-63 (2012).
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From its first day to the present day, the Court has routinely
followed the majority-rule principle without even appearing to give
the matter much thought. As a rule, when five Justices today say that
the law means X and four say it means Y, X it is. Over the years the
Court has invalidated dozens of congressional laws by the slimmest of
margins: 5-4.
Politicians and commentators have occasionally urged Congress
to respond with a statute forbidding the Court to strike down federal
legislation unless the Court vote is at least 6-3. Yet Congress has
never followed this advice-and with good reason, for hidden within
this proposal there lurk at least two distinct and insuperable Article
VI supremacy-clause problems. First, in situations not governed by
the proposed statute the Court would presumably continue to operate
by majority rule. For example, Congress surely would not want the
Court to enforce state laws violating congressional statutes so long as
the state got four of the nine Court votes. But if a simple majority
vote would suffice to vindicate a federal statute over a state law, the
same simple majority vote should suffice to vindicate the Constitution
over a federal statute. By trying to change the Court's voting rule
selectively, the proposed statute would violate the legal hierarchy laid
down in Article VI, which privileges the Constitution over federal
statutes in exactly the same way that it privileges (constitutionally
proper) federal statutes over mere state laws. Second and more
generally, any statute that gave a jurist brandishing a mere
congressional law (or any other sub-constitutional law) a weightier
vote than a dueling jurist wielding the Constitution would improperly
invert the clear prioritization of legal norms established by the
supremacy clause.
8. Could Congress enact a statute requiring that no federal law be held unconstitutional
unless the court hearing the case is unanimous? If so, were Congress to structure a Court of 100
members (as the Constitution allows), the Court would have to enforce a federal law even if 99
of the 100 Justices found that law clearly unconstitutional. At this point, judicial review would
have effectively been undone by a mere statute. If this goes too far-and it surely does-the
only principled stopping point on the slippery slope is to insist that Congress may pass no law
giving any judge who sides against a constitutional claim more weight than a judge who sides
with a constitutional claim-a principle implicit in the supremacy clause itself.
Two state constitutions have provisions preventing their respective state supreme
courts from declaring state legislation unconstitutional unless the court acts by supermajority. In
North Dakota, the state constitution authorizes a majority of a quorum of the state supreme
court to act for the court in all situations "provided that the supreme court shall not declare a
legislative enactment unconstitutional unless at least four [of the five] of the members of the
court so decide." N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4. This clause has been understood to apply only when
the issue is whether a North Dakota statute violates the state constitution. Thus read, it raises
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Could the Justices themselves decide by simple majority rule to
abandon Court-majority rule in some situations where these sorts of
supremacy-clause problems do not arise? In fact, the Court has done
just that, but in a manner that has preserved the ultimate authority of
majority rule. By Court tradition, four Justices-a minority-can put
a case on the docket and can ordinarily guarantee that the petitioner
seeking review will be able to press his case via full briefing and oral
argument. But ultimately, the Court majority of five has the last
word-not just on the merits of the case, but on whether the Court
itself will in fact issue any opinion. At any time, a simple Court
majority of five can dismiss any case on the docket, even if the
remaining four Justices adamantly object. In short, minority rules
such as the "Rule of Four" nest within a framework of simple
majority rule.'
A similar analysis applies to the voting rules followed by the
House of Representatives. In general, the House follows the
Constitution's implicit directive of simple majority rule in performing
its basic constitutional functions: enacting legislation, authorizing
expenditures, organizing itself, judging its members' elections and
qualifications, issuing subpoenas, adjudicating contempts, maintaining
order within its own walls, and impeaching executive and judicial
officers. True, a labyrinth of House rules-most obviously, a set of
rules enabling committees and the House leadership to dictate the
House agenda and another set of rules regulating parliamentary
no major federal problem. North Dakota is not obliged to have a state constitution that trumps
ordinary state statutes, nor is the state obliged to provide for strong judicial enforcement of its
state constitution. The Nebraska Constitution features a similar clause: "A majority of the [state
supreme court] members sitting shall have authority to pronounce a decision except in cases
involving the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature. No legislative act shall be held
unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five [of the court's seven] judges." NEB. CONST.
art. V, § 2. The Nebraska clause apparently has been held by the state supreme court to apply to
cases involving claims that a state statute violates the federal Constitution. See DeBacker v.
Brainard, 161 N.W. 2d 508, 508-09 (Neb. 1968) (per curiam); see also DeBacker v. Sigler, 175
N.W. 2d 912, 914 (Neb. 1970) (Spencer, J., dissenting). To the extent that this clause might
direct the state's highest court to affirmatively enforce a state statute despite the fact that a
court majority deems the statute contrary to the U.S. Constitution, this clause plainly violates
the federal supremacy clause, which specifically addresses state judges and obliges them to
prioritize the U.S. Constitution over a mere state statute. No other state follows the North
Dakota or Nebraska model. Instead, majority rule generally prevails on state courts. For an
excellent discussion, see Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme
Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73 (2003).
9. For a subtle analysis of how the Court's majority has ultimately exercised its power to
manage and/or dismiss cases docketed by a Court minority, see Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S.
Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1067 (1988).
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procedure-may prevent a given matter from ever reaching the
House floor for a simple majority vote. But these internal rules are
themselves authorized at the biennial beginning of each new
Congress under the aegis of Article I, Section 5-and they are
authorized by a simple chamber majority in keeping with the
Constitution's letter and spirit.0
II.
Not so with what has now become perhaps the most
dysfunctional aspect of modern American institutional practice: the
Senate filibuster. Thanks to an internal Senate rule allowing
filibusters-Senate Rule 22, to be precise-the de facto threshold for
enacting a wide range of legislation has in recent years become 60
votes instead of the constitutionally proper 51 votes. Under Rule 22, a
mere 41 senators can prevent a typical bill from ever reaching the
Senate floor for a final vote, even if 59 senators on the other side are
intensely eager to end debate and approve the bill. Can you spell
"gridlock?"
The filibuster rule itself is not approved biennially at the outset
of each new congressional term. Rather, this old rule, initially
adopted by the Senate in the 1910s and significantly revised in the
1970s, simply carries over from one Congress to the next by inertia,
under the notion that the Senate, unlike the House, is a continuing
body. Thus Senate rules, once in place, need never be formally
10. Although in recent years the House occasionally adopted internal rules requiring
supermajority votes in the enactment of certain types of laws-laws raising taxes, for example-
leading constitutional scholars have condemned these rules as unconstitutional under Article I,
Section 7, see Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 83. Other thoughtful scholars have defended these
rules by arguing that each house has always retained the inalienable right to suspend
supermajority requirements at any time, and to do so by a simple majority vote-a theory
honoring the Constitution's basic requirement of house-majority rule, but relocating the
effective locus of this constitutional norm from Article I, Section 7 to Article I, Section 5. See
John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of
Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative Supernajority Rules, 47
DuKE L.J. 327, 343-46 (1997). One noteworthy limit on the agenda-setting power of House
leaders and committees is embodied in the device of the discharge petition. Through this
theoretically important if little-used safety valve, a majority of the entire House-218
members-may bypass committee veto-gates and bring a bill to the floor. And for the argument
that all House rules are and indeed must be modifiable at all times by a later House majority,
see id.; see also United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
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reenacted. Similarly, Senate leaders, once in place, need never be
formally re-elected."
But the Senate does generally retain the right to oust any
holdover leaders at any time and to do so by a simple majority vote-
and this majoritarian principle, which clearly applies to holdover
Senate leaders, should also apply to holdover Senate rules. Thus, all
Senate rules, including the filibuster rule, are valid if and only if a
majority of the Senate at any time may change the old rules by simple
majority vote."
But some senators today seem to believe that a simple Senate
majority cannot change the old filibuster rule, even if this Senate
majority emphatically wants change. Why not? Because the old
filibuster rule says so. That's some catch, that Catch-22."
This circular logic will not do. The filibuster rule, like every other
American law or regulation, is ultimately subordinate to America's
Constitution. If the Constitution requires ultimate majority rule in the
Senate, no purported Senate rule may properly say otherwise. And in
fact, America's Constitution, correctly understood, does require
ultimate majority rule in the Senate. Insofar as the old filibuster rule
claims the status of an entrenched protocol that cannot be altered by
an insistent current Senate majority, then the old filibuster rule is to
this exact extent unconstitutional, and should be treated as such by
the Senate itself, acting as the proper promulgators and judges of
their own procedures. Concretely, if a simple majority of the Senate
ever did take steps to repeal the filibuster rule, the Senate's presiding
officer should rule this repeal to be in order and this ruling from the
chair should be upheld by a simple Senate majority. And that would
be that: No more filibusters.
We need not insist that a current Senate majority has the right to
change its rules instantaneously and peremptorily. Thus, the Senate's
presiding officer may properly allow each side ample time to make its
11. The specific ways in which the Senate operates as a "continuing body" are complex, as
I explain in my coda.
12. Thus, while the Senate need not re-enact its standing rules every two years-as the
House has generally felt it must-the Senate, like the House, must be free to repeal any
standing rule and must be free to do so by simple majority vote.
13. According to Senate Rule 22-I swear I am not making up this number!-a motion to
end debate "shall be decided in the affirmative by three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and
sworn-except on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules, in which case the necessary
affirmative vote shall be two-thirds of the Senators present and voting." STANDING RULES OF




case before holding a vote on a Senate rule change. But any attempt
to prevent a reform vote altogether via dilatory tactics-that is, any
attempt to indefinitely filibuster attempted filibuster reform-would
violate the applicable written and unwritten constitutional principles.
This conclusion may astonish. Some might think that if the name
of the game is close attention to actual governmental practice, the fact
that the filibuster exists, and the fact that many senators claim that it
cannot be altered by a simple majority are unanswerable game-
winners.
It is precisely at this point that the general framework that I put
forth in my recent book, America's Unwritten Constitution, proves its
worth. In a nutshell, I argued in that book that there exist various
tools and techniques enabling interpreters to range beyond individual
words and clauses in the written Constitution while remaining
entirely faithful to the grand project of American constitutionalism.
Let us, then, carefully apply this framework to the filibuster issue.
Begin by noting that even though majority rule is not always
explicitly specified in various clauses of the written Constitution, it
surely forms part of America's implicit Constitution in certain
respects. If the Senate may entrench (that is, enact and insulate from
simple majoritarian repeal) a rule that 60 votes are required to pass a
given bill, the Senate could likewise entrench a rule that 70 votes are
required. But such a rule would plainly violate the letter and logic of
Article I, Section 7, which provides that a two-thirds Senate majority
always suffices, even when the president vetoes a particular bill.
Surely it follows a fortiori that something less than a two-thirds vote
suffices in the absence of a veto.
And that something is majority rule, as is powerfully evident
from America's enacted Constitution-that is, from the very process
by which the written text itself was enacted into law and thus sprang
to life. This enactment process in 1787-88 confirms that majority rule
does indeed go without saying in the Constitution, in the absence of
strong implicit or explicit contraindication. Majority rule supplied the
self-evident master norm for state ratifying conventions organized
under Article VII. This key fact provides a compelling reason to
believe that majority rule likewise provides the self-evident master
norm for senatorial legislation under Article I, Section 7 and also for
senatorial internal rulemaking under Article I, Section 5. Thus, unless
we find in the written or unwritten Constitution some strong
contraindication, majority rule is the Constitution's proper voting
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protocol when the Senate decides whether to keep or scrap the
filibuster rule."
Nothing in America's lived Constitution-the norms and customs
of ordinary Americans living out their daily lives-provides strong
contraindication. While it would be surprising if the daily rhythms
and routines of average Americans decisively answered technical
questions concerning the Senate's internal procedures, it is perhaps
noteworthy that when average Americans participate in various clubs
and the like, they quite often and without much ado practice majority
rule.
Likewise, nothing in America's doctrinal Constitution, based on
judicial teachings, supports the entrenched filibuster. Not only have
the Justices themselves always followed majority rule, but in the 1892
case, United States v. Ballin, the Court explicitly embraced majority
rule as the background master norm for each house of Congress:
[T]he general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a
quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of
the body. This has been the rule for all time, except so far as in any
given case the terms of the organic act under which the body is
assembled have prescribed specific limitations. . . . No such
limitation is found in the Federal Constitution, and therefore the
general law of such bodies obtains.
Nor does anything in America's symbolic Constitution-the special
cultural icons in our legal-cultural pantheon, such as Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address and King's "I Have a Dream" speech-argue for
an entrenched Senate filibuster rule. Many ordinary citizens today
disdain Senate Rule 22, and this disdain has a long history. The most
memorable filibusters in the American experience occurred in the
1950s and early 1960s, when various Southern senators tried to thwart
much-needed civil rights legislation-legislation that eventually
passed in the mid-1960s and became the pride of the nation,
reaffirming the equality of all races (and also of both sexes). In short,
key elements of America's symbolic Constitution came about despite
the filibuster, not because of it.
Nor, finally, does the history of actual institutional practice
provide solid support for an entrenched filibuster rule. Properly
14. On majority rule as the obvious command of Article I, Section 7, see Rubenfeld, supra
note 6, at 78-85. On majority rule as the obvious command of Article I, Section 5 see McGinnis
& Rappaport, supra note 10, at 343-46.
15. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1891).
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construed and contextualized, the history of Senate practice in fact
supports modern-day filibuster reformers. 6
Nothing like Rule 22's Catch-22 was in place in the age of
George Washington or in the Jeffersonian era that followed.
Throughout the 1790s and early 1800s the Senate practiced and
preached simple majority rule. Under the procedures that governed
the Senate during its earliest years, a senator could move "the
previous question" and thereby end debate if a majority of senators
agreed; and senators could also call an unruly orator to order at any
time and thereby oblige him to "sit down," subject to a ruling by the
chair and if necessary an appeal to the Senate as whole."
While some scholars have quibbled about the precise operation
of these initial rules, the history of the Senate prior to the 1830s offers
no notable examples of organized and obstructionist filibustering-
and absolutely nothing like a pattern of systematic, self-perpetuating,
entrenched frustration of Senate-majority rule. Thomas Jefferson, the
Senate's presiding officer from 1797-1801, was thus describing actual
senatorial norms and usages when he penned the following passages
of his 1801 Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of the Senate
of the United States: "No one is to speak impertinently or beside the
question, superfluously or tediously. . . . The voice of the majority
decides. For the lex majoris partis is the law of all councils, elections,
&c. where not otherwise expressly provided.",
For much of the mid-nineteenth century, even as Senate
minorities began to develop and deploy dilatory tactics, these tactics
typically occurred with the indulgence of the Senate majority.
Longwinded speechifying occasionally delayed the Senate's business,
but ordinarily orations did not prevent majorities from ending debate
at some point and taking a vote. The Senate in those days was smaller
and had less business to transact. The upper chamber often opted to
indulge individual senators as a matter of courtesy. In turn, the
indulged senators did not routinely try to press their privileges so as
to prevent Senate majorities from governing. For example, in 1850
16. For a wise reminder that practices do not typically interpret and contextualize
themselves, and that different opinions are apt to exist about how best to interpret a practice,
see Jerry L. Mashaw, Governmental Practice and Presidential Direction: Lessons from the
Antebellum Republic?, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 659, 663 (2009).
17. S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (April 16, 1789).
18. See generally SARAH S. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?
FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1997); Richard R. Beeman, Unlimited Debate
in the Senate, the First Phase, 83 POL. SC. Q. 419 (1968).
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politicians of all stripes from all regions understood that California's
admission-giving free states a narrow but decisive majority over
slave states in the Senate-mattered hugely precisely because the
Senate's operative principle in the mid-nineteenth century was in fact
simple majority rule. According to one expert treatise, prior to the
1880s virtually every obstructed measure eventually prevailed against
the opposition's stalling tactics."
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, routine
filibustering practices have skyrocketed. Yet senators in the modern
era have failed to achieve a general consensus via a compelling line of
clean, consistent Senate rulings on the key constitutional question.
Properly framed, this question is not whether the Senate may choose
by inaction and inertia to keep the filibuster, nor whether the Senate
may choose to keep the filibuster by re-adopting it via a fresh
majority vote. Rather, the question is whether the current Senate is
simply stuck with the old filibuster rule, even if a current majority
emphatically wants to change the rule and explicitly votes to do so.
This issue has only intermittently arisen in a clean parliamentary
fashion. Over the years various senators may have quietly favored the
old filibuster rule but have not wanted to publicly take the blame for
this position, preferring instead to shroud the issue in layer upon layer
of procedural complexity.
In 1975, a majority of the Senate in fact upheld a constitutional
ruling of the vice president, sitting in the chair, that a mere majority
could rightfully end debate on filibuster reform and overturn the old
filibuster rule. Shortly thereafter, however, the Senate voted to
reconsider its earlier action, leaving us today with a Rorschach-blot
precedent whose meaning is largely in the eye of the beholder. In the
early twenty-first century, Republican senators frustrated by the
success of the Democratic minority in blocking votes on various
judicial nominations loudly threatened to revise the old filibuster rule
by a simple majority vote. This threatened revision, popularly
nicknamed "the nuclear option," never came to a conclusive floor
vote. Instead, Democrats moderated their obstructionism and
Republicans sheathed their sword.
19. FRANKLIN L. BURDETrE, FILIBUSTERING IN THE SENATE 39 (1940); see also David R.
Mayhew, Supermajority Rule in the U.S. Senate, 36 POL. SCL & POL. 31, 31 (2003) (noting that
for most of its history, the Senate never "had any anti-majoritarian barrier as concrete, as
decisive, or as consequential as today's rule of 60"). See generally Beeman, supra note 18.
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Precursors of this "nuclear option"-also known as "the
constitutional option"-were forcefully advocated by prominent
senators throughout the twentieth century, and at various moments
over the last sixty years these precursors have in fact won the
considered support of vice presidents and Senate majority leaders of
both parties. Many of the most important filibuster reforms of the
twentieth century came about when reformers first threatened the
''constitutional option" and then compromised by effectuating their
desired reforms in an endgame process that formally obeyed the
Senate's Catch-22 rule structure.20
If a Senate majority truly were powerless to set things right, then
Senate practice would be wildly out of step with the practice of its
sibling body, the House of Representatives. In the House, majority-
rule rules today and has always ruled. While this fact alone does not
prove that majority rule is required by Article I, Section 5, it surely
confirms that majority rule is consistent with this Section.21
20. For discussion of the 1975 rulings, see John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress:
Further Notes on the Constitutionality of the Senate Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505, 516-17
(2004). For a contrasting account claiming the existence of a clear senatorial pattern rejecting
prototypes of the nuclear option, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster,
21 CONST. COMMENT. 445, 476-78 (2004). Gerhardt's own narrative, however, itself provides
evidence that the Senate has in fact flip-flopped on the key issue. For an illuminating account of
the strong senatorial and vice presidential support for the nuclear/constitutional option for
much of the last century, and a sophisticated discussion of how the strong threat of the
nuclear/constitutional option has repeatedly operated to win filibuster reforms that formally
followed the Catch-22 voting rules laid down by previous Senate rules, see Martin B. Gold and
Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option To Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A
Majoritarian Means To Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205 (2004). For
the early-twenty-first-century Republicans' argument for the nuclear option, see John Cornyn,
Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 181 (2003); Orrin G. Hatch, Judicial Nomination Filibuster Cause and Cure, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 803.
21. For a qualification/clarification of my claim about House practice, see supra note 10.
Note that the majority-rule principle operates slightly differently for each half of Congress. In
the House, new rules are affirmatively adopted by majority vote at the start of every new
congressional term. In the Senate, the old rules need not be adopted by majority vote at the
start, but must be repealable by majority rule. Under an alternative characterization, the old
Senate's rules do lapse at the end of each Congress, just like the old House's rules, but the new
Senate need not formally vote to readopt the old Senate rules at the outset of a new Congress.
Instead, the new Senate may implicitly readopt the old Senate simply by acting in conformity
with them. On this view, the new Senate at the beginning of its session may adopt a wholly new
set of rules and may do so by following "general parliamentary law"-which enables a simple
majority to end debate-until these new rules are adopted. See Gold & Gupta, supra note 20, at
220-22 (explaining this theory-an early version of the constitutional option-as put forth by




The politically convenient assertion that today's Senate majority
is simply a powerless captive of ghosts of Senates past should ring
particularly hollow to British ears-and this hollowness deserves
special attention in any analysis of how America's Constitution might
look to a proper British constitutionalist attentive to unwritten
constitutional norms and principles. While Britain has never had an
American-style written Constitution, the British have developed a
deep understanding of the proper relationship among Parliaments
over time. It is a bedrock principle of British constitutionalism that
one Parliament cannot bind a later Parliament. Otherwise, the
inalienable right of parliamentary self-government would be lost.
Indeed, what makes a right inalienable is precisely the fact that it is
incapable of being waived, even by an actual practice of apparent
waiver.
Just as Americans at the Founding surely understood that no
person could be a judge in his own case, thanks in part to
Blackstone's clear formulation of the basic principle, so too the
Founders were intimately familiar with and embraced what
Blackstone had to say about the relationship between one legislature
and its successor: "Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of
subsequent parliaments bind not." Why not? Because, Blackstone
explained, prior Parliaments are not legally superior to subsequent
Parliaments. By what voting rule would each parliament proceed?
Here too, Blackstone was clear: "In each house the act of the majority
binds the whole." 22
The same logic applies on this side of the Atlantic. Each house
can make rules for itself. But neither house can entrench rules in a
way that prevents a later house from governing itself. Only the
Constitution can create entrenched rules of this sort. And on this
22. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *181. For analysis of British practice and
theory strongly supportive of the approach advocated here, see Josh Chafetz's remarks in his
debate with Michael Gerhardt, Is the Filibuster Constitutional?, 158 U. PA L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 245, 250 (2010). On the equality of legislatures across time, see THE FEDERALIST
No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[T]he last [statute] in order of time shall be preferred to the
first . . . from the nature and reason of the thing. . . . [B]etween the interfering acts of an equal
authority, that which was the last indication of its [the legislature's] will, should have the
preference."); cf Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879) (similar). On majority rule
within each house, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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issue, the rule that the Constitution has entrenched for each house is
majority rule.'
Because this protocol is established by the Constitution itself, the
protocol cannot be changed by either house or by statute. Just as
Congress may not properly enact an ordinary statute that changes the
constitutional rules governing how future ordinary statutes are to be
enacted, so too neither house may properly enact a house rule that
changes the constitutional rules governing how future house rules are
to be enacted.
IV.
Here is one way, then, of pulling together the basic argument. It
is obvious that some specific voting rule must be used to
operationalize the Article I, Section 5 power and duty of each house
to determine its own rules of proceeding. If majority rule is not the
implicit rule, what is? Without some jumpstarting rule, the first House
and the first Senate in 1789 would have faced an insoluble infinite
regress problem. (By what initial voting rule would each house decide
what voting rule to use in determining its rules of proceedings? By
what pre-initial voting rule would that initial voting rule be decided?
By what pre-pre-initial voting rule would the pre-initial voting rule be
decided? And so on, without end.) But no such infinite regress in fact
occurred in the first Congress because majority rule did in fact go
without saying in each house in 1789 just as it had gone without
saying in each ratifying convention in 1787-88. This first set of Article
I, Section 5 votes thus established the first key point of actual
practice.
Just as the first House and the first Senate each used majority
rule to decide its procedures, every subsequent House and Senate
may and must do the same, for nothing in the Constitution made the
Congress of 1789 king over later Congresses. All Congresses are
equal in this respect. In fact-and this is a second key point about
23. Clear evidence that the Founding generation accepted this logic comes from the text of
Virginia's 1786 Bill of Religious Freedom, a landmark statute enacted largely thanks to the
efforts of Jefferson and Madison: "[W]e well know that this Assembly, elected by the people for
the ordinary purposes of Legislation only, have no power to restrain the acts of succeeding
Assemblies constituted with powers equal to our own, and that therefore to declare this act
irrevocable would be of no effect in law." An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785 Va.
Acts ch. 34, reprinted in 12 STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF




actual practice-neither house has ever formally required a
supermajority for amendment of its rules. Not even Senate Rule 22
has the audacity to openly assert that it cannot be repealed by simple
majority vote. Rather, Rule 22 says only that debate on its own repeal
cannot be ended by simple majority vote.
The question thus becomes, is this supermajoritarian aspect of
Rule 22 a genuine rule of debate or a de facto rule of decision? If
Rule 22 simply means that the rule itself should not be repealed
without a fair opportunity to debate the repeal, then Rule 22 is fully
valid. But insofar as Rule 22 in fact allows repeal opponents to stall
interminably so as to prevent a majoritarian repeal vote from ever
being held, then Rule 22 is to that precise extent operating as an
unconstitutionally entrenching supermajority rule of decision rather
than a proper rule of debate. It is the right and duty of each senator to
adjudicate for herself whether Rule 22 has in fact come to operate as
an improper rule of decision rather than a proper rule of debate. And
in adjudicating that question, the Senate, acting as a constitutional
court of sorts, acts by majority rule, just as the Supreme Court itself
does when adjudicating constitutional (and other) questions.
CODA: A NOTE ON THE SENATE AS A CONTINUING BODY
A simple question: Is the Senate a continuing body? It turns out
the answer is not so simple, as illustrated by last month's activities on
Capitol Hill. And getting the right answer matters crucially for
sensible filibuster reform in the weeks and months ahead.
For some purposes, the Senate is surely a continuing
body. Whereas the incoming House of Representatives had to
affirmatively vote for John Boehner as its Speaker, no similar drama
unfolded in the Senate: Harry Reid continued as Majority Leader
purely by inertia, with no fuss or fanfare. So too, because Senator Pat
Leahy had become Senate President pro tempore in the old Congress,
he simply remained in place as the new Congress commenced.
For other purposes, however, the Senate is not a continuing
body. All the bills that passed the Senate before January 3 went
"poof" as the clock chimed midnight. Most obviously, the $60 billion
Hurricane Sandy relief package approved by the Senate in late
December turned to dust at the witching hour. Thus a new relief bill




So the correct answer to our simple yes-or-no question is yes-
and-no. Though this seeming doublespeak may trouble some layfolk,
there is nothing sinister afoot here. Law often works this way, as
many of you doubtless learned in your 1L classes. For example, are
corporations persons? Yes and no. Surely yes, for some purposes:
Government cannot deprive a corporation of its property without due
process of law. But for other purposes, corporations are properly not
treated as persons. The axiom of one person, one vote applies only to
flesh-and-blood.
But what unifying principle explains when to treat the Senate as
continuous and when to treat it as noncontinuous? And what does
this unifying principle mean for filibuster reform?
Because our written Constitution is remarkably terse, certain
overarching principles must be inferred from the document read as a
whole-principles such as the separation of powers, federalism, and
the rule of law. Legislative bicameralism is another implicit principle.
When passing laws, the Senate must act in tight bicameral co-
ordination with the House.
The House is obviously not a continuing body. Every two years
its entire membership comes before the voters, who are free to
choose a completely new slate. Legally, no House member holds over
from one House to the next. Because each House begins anew
biennially, all House legislative bills legally expire when that House
expires and a new House arises to replace it. In the spirit of bicameral
symmetry and co-ordination, the same rules about legislative bills
sensibly apply to the Senate: All Senate bills die when one Congress
ends and a new one begins. Such has been the practice since the
Founding.
But on matters other than bicameral lawmaking, the
Constitution generally allows each chamber to govern itself, and
neither need mirror the other. The House must choose its leaders and
its own internal rules of procedure at the outset of each new
Congress, because all its members have been freshly elected by the
voters. By contrast, only a third of the Senate's membership comes
before the voters in any given election, so this chamber can simply
allow its internal procedures and its internal leadership to continue by
inertia. Harry Reid need not be re-elected at the outset of this new
Congress, but of course he can be ousted on any day if a Senate
majority so decides. So too with old Senate rules, which need not be




Which brings us back, one last time, to the question of filibuster
reform. The old Senate's rules permitting filibusters carry forward by
inertia. Of course they can be changed in January of odd-numbered
years, as a new Congress begins, but they can also be changed on any
other day-just as the Senate leadership can be changed at any time.
Changing rules or leaders within a session is not improperly changing
the rules of the game in the middle of the game. Rather, the game
itself, as defined by the Constitution's governing principles, allows
new procedural rules and new leaders at any moment.
But there is at least one basic constitutional principle that, absent
a constitutional amendment, cannot be changed, ever: Majority
rule-lex majoris partis. The Constitution makes no sense without this
rule as the implicit backdrop. Constitutional amendments require
supermajorities precisely because ordinary statutes do not; overruling
a president's veto requires a two-thirds vote of each house precisely
because passing an ordinary law requires something less, namely a
simple majority. In 1789, the first Senate adopted its procedural rules
by simple majority vote, and all later Senates may likewise amend
these rules by simple majority.
Notably, the Senate's existing filibuster rules do not themselves
purport to require a supermajority vote to change them. But they do
purport to require a supermajority vote to end debate on the question
of filibuster reform.
The simple solution to the issue of filibuster reform is thus for
the Senate to take Rule 22 at its word and insist that this rule remain
a mere rule of debate rather than a de facto rule of decision. In other
words, the Senate must see to it that internal rules of debate and
procedure stay within their constitutional bounds, and do not
unconstitutionally morph into entrenched supermajority voting
rules. The Senate itself today or on any day may properly decide that
filibuster-reform opponents are actually preventing filibuster reform
from ever coming to a vote. If so, reform opponents have improperly
crossed a constitutional line: the filibuster rule is no longer operating
as a constitutionally proper rule of genuine debate, but has instead
become an unconstitutional supermajority rule of decision. In this
situation, a simple majority of the Senate can rule that the filibuster
system is operating unconstitutionally, in violation of the underlying
majority-rule principle that constitutionally governs both House and
Senate. Thus, a simple majority of Senators can rule any filibuster out
of order, as a violation of constitutional first principles.
2014] 1501
1502 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1483
And to repeat, a majority of Senators can do this today or on any
day, not just in January of odd-numbered years. On this precise issue,
the Senate is indeed a continuing body; no day is any different from
any other day. And unless the Constitution itself explicitly specifies
otherwise (as it does for veto overrides, impeachment trials, and so
on), the Senate always-today and every day-operates by ultimate
majority rule. Every Senate rule and procedure must be amendable
by a determined Senate majority, if that determined majority deems
the old rule unsuitable. It's just that simple.
